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I. Introduction 
 
A. Background 
 
Directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) is a special type of insurance 
which provides coverage for losses arising from claims made against directors and officers of 
corporations.1  Legal problems relating to D&O insurance have created significant issues in the 
U.S. for many years.2  Due to the high number of securities lawsuits in the U.S., corporate 
managers are exposed to huge financial risk in their roles as directors and officers.3  D&O 
insurance functions as the main source of protection from such risks because it can make up for 
losses directly and effectively.4  
D&O insurance was first introduced in the U.S. soon after the Securities Act of 1933 
(“1933 Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”).  Today, most public 
corporations in the U.S. purchase D&O insurance to protect directors and officers, as well as the 
corporation itself.5  Moreover, as the risk of securities litigation increases after the enactment of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, it has become essential that corporations purchase insurance for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), EXECUTIVE AND ORGANIZATION LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY § 1 (Feb. 
2000), http://www.chartisinsurance.com/Public-Company-Directors-and-Officers-Insurance-DandO-
22000_295_195857.html (U.S. D&O policy)  This link leads to Chartis’ website because AIG General Insurance has 
changed its name to “Chartis.”  Reuters, American International Group, Inc. (AIG.N), 
http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?symbol=AIG.N&WTmodLoc=NewsArt-C1-ArticlePage1; 
See also HYUN DAI HAE SANG [HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS.], IM WON BAE SANG CHAEK IM BO HUM YAK KWAN 
[DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY AND COMPANY REIMBURSEMENT POLICY] § 2, 
http://b2b.hi.co.kr/file/prd/compen/pro_01_1.pdf (last visited June 1, 2009) (Korean version of D&O policy); See 
also HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS., DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY AND COMPANY REIMBURSEMENT POLICY 
§ 1, http://b2b.hi.co.kr/file/prd/compen/pro_01_2.pdf (last visited June 1, 2009) (English version of D&O policy). 
2 See Joseph P. Monteleone, Recent Significant and Decisions in Securities Litigation and Related Disputes 
Affecting D&O Insurers, 1692 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 753 (2008). 
3 JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 899 (5th ed. 2000). 
4 Carolyn H. Rosenberg, Insurance Coverage and Securities Litigation Resolution, N98SLIB A.B.A. 
CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 9 (1998). 
5 Joseph P. Monteleone, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and 
Other Topical Issues, SH077 A.L.I-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 313 (2002). 
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directors and officers and that these officials identify the limits of the protection.6  In particular, 
the recent litigation for losses arising from subprime lending in the U.S. has prompted an interest 
in D&O insurance issues.7  Until recently, however, the judicial guidance in this area was not 
sufficient, and many of the issues involved in D&O insurance coverage remained unsolved.  In 
light of such problems, it is necessary to reassess the current D&O insurance system in order to 
provide financial protection to directors and officers as well as encourage capable and 
responsible individuals to accept positions in corporate management.8 
As the financial risk of securities litigation increases after the Korean economic crisis, 
D&O insurance is considered a significant issue in Korea as well.9  The D&O insurance system 
was introduced to Korea in 1991.10  The need for insurance, however, was not emphasized until 
the Korean economic crisis in 1997, when the first shareholders’ lawsuits in Korea were brought 
against Korea First Bank.11  The risk of shareholder litigations triggered interest in D&O 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See JOHN F. OLSON ET AL., DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 1:1, 
at 1-6 to -7 (2003).  
7 See John F. McCarrick, Subprime Claims: D&O and E&O Liability and Coverage Implications, 775 
PRACTISING L. INST. LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 299, 303 (2008); Id. at 305-06 (explaining 
that claims are made against corporate managers for “breaches of fiduciary duty or violations of federal or state 
securities laws in managing or disclosing the corporation’s financial exposure to subprime losses.”); Donna L. 
Wilson, Insurance Coverage Issues in the Subprime Credit Context: Bankrupcy, Insurance, and the Subprime 
Lender, 1668 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 855, 859 (2008) (explaining that 
subprime lenders may face “suits by borrowers alleging violations of federal credit laws and state consumer 
protection statutes…shareholder suits alleging violation of the securities laws…and issuer/underwriter suits alleging 
a failure to buy back loans…suits brought by state attorneys general”). 
8 Seth Van Aalten, D&O Insurance in the Age of Enron: Protecting Officers and Directors in Corporate 
Bankuptcy, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 457, 460 (2003).  
9 See Jong-Sung Eun, Im won deung eui Bae sang chaek im bo hum gum yung sang poom ye Kwan han Bub 
juk Go chal [A Study on the Director’s and Officer’s Liability Insurance], SANG POOM HAK EYUN GU JE24KWON 
1HO [J. OF COMMODITY SCI. & TECH. VOL. 24-1] 23, 24 (2006). 
10 Jin-Hee Hong, Im won bae sang chaek im bo hum yak kwan sang We bub haeng we myun chaek sa you 
eui Hae suk kwa Je moon je [Construction and Several Problems of Conduct Exclusions in the Director’s and 
Officer’s Liability Policy], KI UP BUB EYUN GU JE21KWON JE4HO(TONG KWON JE31HO) [BUS. L. VOL.21-4(31)] 181, 
182 (2008). 
11 Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 2: Court Procedures, 
Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 
2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 84 (2008). 
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insurance in South Korea.12  Furthermore, the Korean government reduced the requirements for 
shareholder derivative suits in 1998 and established a U.S.-style securities class action system in 
2004.13  Having seen the abuse of securities class action in the U.S., Korean corporations feared 
potential losses and began to purchase D&O insurance for their officers and directors.14  
In addition, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2007, followed by the 
Korean Foreign Legal Consultants Act, which was enacted in 2009.  These acts allowed U.S. law 
firms to establish offices in Korea.15  As a result, a number of U.S. law firms with class action 
knowledge and experience will be able to work in Korea.16  Only one securities class action 
lawsuit has ever been filed in Korea, even though the law permiting securities class actions was 
enacted in 2004.17  One possible reason for this inactivity is that Korean law firms avoid 
representing clients in shareholder initiated lawsuits where the corporation may be a prospective 
client.18  Furthermore, smaller Korean law firms cannot advance litigation expenses or bear the 
monetary losses resulting from losing the suit.19  It is expected, however, that the amount of class 
action filing will increase because U.S. law firms, unrelated to Korean corporations, will 
represent plaintiffs once Korean legal markets are open to them.20  As a result, Korean corporate 
directors and officers will be pushed into the financial risk of securities litigation.  Under these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Eun, supra note 9, at 24.  
13 Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1508-09 (2004). 
14 Eun, supra note 9, at 24.  
15 Rahn Kim, Foreign Lawyers to Provide Limited Service, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/02/117_18564.html.  However, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement is not yet approved by their respective congresses. Kyungho Choi, Korean Foreign Legal Consultants 
Act: Legal Profession of American Lawyers in South Korea, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 100, 102 (2010).  Thus, 
“[d]espite enactment of the [Foreign Legal Consultants] Act, U.S. lawyers and law firms need to wait until the 
ratification of the [Agreement] by both couties in order to benefit from the [Act].” Id. 
16 See Kim, supra note 15; Choi, supra note 15, at 102-04.   
17 Kim Rahn, First Class-Action Suit in Offing, KOREA TIMES, June 25, 2009, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/06/113_47475.html.  
18 Black et al., supra note 11 at 22.  
19 Id.   
20 See id.; Choi, supra note 13 at 1517; Kim, supra note 15.  
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circumstances, it will be essential for large corporations to purchase D&O insurance in Korea as 
well.21 
Despite the apparent need, the Korean legal system is not prepared to address the issues 
surrounding D&O insurance.22  In addition, Korean courts do not have sufficient experience in 
this kind of insurance practice.23  This is inferred from the following facts: first, the Korea 
Commercial Act does not provide standards for D&O insurance.24  Thus, in disputes involving 
D&O insurance, the court can rely only on policy forms used in practice.25  Second, there are 
only three Supreme Court cases concerning D&O insurance in Korea since 1991.26  This lack of 
statutes and prior cases makes it difficult for the court to decide on such matters.  Third, D&O 
policy in Korea exists in two forms: a Korean version and an English version.27  Not only are 
these policies written in different languages but they also differ in content.28  The Korean version 
is used only for domestically insured corporations.29  The English version is used for 
corporations which need reinsurance by international insurers.30  The coexistence of these two 
very different documents is a source of confusion.31 
Unlike in Korea, a number of cases regarding D&O insurance have been decided in the 
U.S., and controversial issues have provided many opportunities for the courts to set precedent.32  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 See Hong, supra note 10, at 182.  
22 See id. at 183.  
23 See id.   
24 Black et al., supra note 11, at 85.  
25 Id.   
26 See Dae bub won [Supreme Court] 2003 15297 (S.Korea); Dae bub won [Supreme Court] 2003 19053 
(S.Korea); Dae bub won [Supreme Court] 2002 69259 (S.Korea); Jeong Seo, Im won bae sang chak im bo hum 
[D&O Liability Insurance], MIN SA PAN RAE YEON GU XXIX [CIV. CASE REV. XXIX] 1079, 1084 (2007).  
27 Eun, supra note 9, at 26.   
28 See id.  
29 Hong, supra note 10, at 181.  
30 Id.  
31 See Hyo Jun Park, Ee sa eui Chaek im Je han ye Kwan han Eyun gu [A Study on the Limitation of the 
Director’s Liability], 150 (Dec. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Changwon National University). 
32 See generally Robert H. Shulman et al., Hot Issues in D&O Insurance, 719 PRACTISING L. INST. LITIG. & 
ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 205 (2005) (explaining current issues regarding D&O insurance). 
5 
The examination of the current issues concerning U.S. D&O insurance is helpful not only to the 
U.S., but to Korea as well, because both countries have a number of common elements of D&O 
policy.  Moreover, the comparative study in this area will be useful to other countries governed 
by civil law which plan to adopt U.S.-style D&O insurance systems. 
 
B. Purpose and Synopsis 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide ways to better protect corporate directors and 
officers from the burdens of securities litigation through a comparison of D&O insurance in the 
U.S. and South Korea.  As the financial risk of securities litigation increases, D&O insurance is 
considered a significant issue not only in the U.S., but in Korea as well.  Until recently, however, 
the jurisprudence in this area was not developed; thus, many problems in this area of law remain 
unresolved.  This paper examines the current issues concerning D&O insurance in the U.S. and 
South Korea, and provides recommendations for the Korean D&O insurance system by 
referencing the U.S. D&O insurance system. 
The body of this paper is composed of six chapters.  Chapter I lays out the background 
and purpose of this study.  Chapter II discusses the role of D&O insurance in securities litigation.  
This chapter addresses how D&O insurance protects directors, officers, and corporations from 
the burdens of derivative litigation and class action litigation.  It also deals with the relationship 
between indemnification and D&O insurance.  In addition, this chapter examines how D&O 
insurers monitor corporate governance.  
Chapter III provides an overview of the Korean D&O insurance system.  This chapter 
analyzes components of Korean D&O policy, including the scope of coverage and exclusion.  It 
6 
compares and contrasts the two current versions of Korean D&O policy.  The examination of 
these policies is very meaningful because it is the basis for a potential solution to many of the 
problems in Korean D&O insurance.   
Chapter IV compares the U.S. and South Korean D&O insurance systems.  This chapter 
addresses controversial issues arising in the U.S. or South Korea: whether the corporation can 
pay an insurance premium for officials, whether the insurance covers defense and settlement 
costs, whether defense costs are advanced, and whether the insurers have an obligation to defend 
the insured in securities litigations.  In addition, this chapter discusses allocation issues and 
coverage exclusions.  
Chapter V offers recommendations for the reform of the Korean D&O insurance system.  
The proposed reform is based on discussions in chapters II, III and IV.  This chapter contains 
suggestions regarding the reconsideration of mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance 
information, the reform of the Korean Commercial Act, the reform of the contents of D&O 
policy, and the specification of guidelines for D&O insurance coverage in litigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
II. The Role of D&O Liability Insurance in Securities Litigation 
 
A. Protection Against the Burdens of Securities Litigation 
 
7 
Corporate directors and officers are exposed to securities litigation risks as a part of 
normal business operations.33  During day-to-day management, they are subject to fiduciary 
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.34  If the officials violate their fiduciary duties, the 
corporation may seek damages by bringing a lawsuit against them.35  Even if the corporation opts 
not to initiate litigation, shareholders can often bring a derivative action against officials on 
behalf of the corporation.36  Furthermore, shareholders may bring a securities class action 
directly against directors and officers if their acts constitute securities fraud.37 
This potential litigation risk may discourage directors and officers from actively 
managing their business.38  Without adequate protection from personal liability, talented 
individuals may not be willing to work as directors or officers, realizing that the rewards may not 
be worth the risks.39  D&O insurance is designed to avoid such risks and to allow talented 
executives to have top positions within corporations.40  The fundamental purpose of D&O 
insurance is to protect individual directors and officers from the costs of litigation,41 and thus it 
functions as the main source of protection from such risks.42  
However, the protections offered by D&O insurance are not limited to individual 
directors and officers; D&O insurance also protects the corporation itself from securities 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 See Aalten, supra note 8, at 457.  
34 CHARLES R.T. O’KELLY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 235 (5th ed. 2006).  
35 Id. at 237.    
36 Id.  
37 See JOHN H. MATHIAS, JR. ET AL., DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY : PREVENTION, INSURANCE AND 
INDEMNIFICATION § 3.01, at 3-3 (2002); See also Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ 
and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlement, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 764 (2009). 
38 Matthew Benjamin, Risky Business: Life in the Executive Suite is Taking a Sour Turn, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, Sept. 9, 2002, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/020909/archive_022500.htm.      
39 See id.  
40 See Aalten, supra note 8, at 460.  
41 Id. at 470.   
42 Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 9.   
8 
litigation burdens.43  Ultimately, the protective function of D&O insurance is accomplished 
through three types of coverage: Side A, Side B, and Side C.44  Side A coverage directly protects 
individual directors and officers; Side B coverage reimburses the corporation; and Side C 
coverage protects the corporation itself.45  Although Side B appears to cover the corporation, the 
fundamental purpose of covering indemnification is to protect individual directors and officers.46   
Side A coverage is the personal part of D&O insurance.47 This coverage protects 
individual directors and officers by insuring against loss where the corporation does not 
indemnify its managers.48  In particular, the insurer will pay managers for loss under Side A 
coverage when the corporation refuses to or cannot indemnify them due to a derivative action or 
a corporation’s insolvency.49  
Side B coverage is the portion of D&O insurance which offers company 
reimbursement.50  This coverage does not apply to directors and officers, but rather the 
corporation, for it reimburses the corporation for expenses to indemnify its directors and 
officers.51  Side B coverage arises only when the corporation indemnifies its directors and 
officers.52  The scope of coverage is also limited to the extent of indemnification.53  Thus, if 
corporate managers cannot be indemnified, then Side B coverage is not allowed.54 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 David B. Parker, The Role of Liability Insurance in Securities Litigation, 491 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. 
L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 373 (1985).  
44 Sean J. Griffith, Uncorvering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details 
Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1164-65 (2006).  
45 Id. at 1163-67.  
46 See Aalten, supra note 8, at 470.   
47 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 23.02, 
at 23-3 (7th ed. 2006).  
48 AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1; See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note  47, § 23.02, at 23-3. 
49 See John Collen, Bankruptcy and D&O Insurance, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 121, 122 (Jan.-Feb. 2002); 
Griffith, supra note 44, at 1166. 
50 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 23-3.  
51 See AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1(ii); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 23-3.   
52 Griffith, supra note 44, at 1165.    
53 See AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1(ii).  
54 See Griffith, supra note 44, at 1165.   
9 
Side C coverage is the corporate liability part of D&O insurance.55  This coverage 
protects the entity itself by insuring loss from claims made against the corporation.56  Side C is 
not traditionally included as part of the coverage.57  Thus, the corporation itself is not protected 
unless the policy stipulates that the corporation’s losses be covered.58  Currently, however, a 
number of D&O policies include the entity coverage.59   
However, a concern involved with most insurance policies is known as the “moral 
hazard” problem, which addresses carelessness on the part of the insured.60  D&O insurance also 
invites this problem because protecting corporate directors and officers from the burdens of 
securities litigation may encourage lax behavior on the part of management.61  Securities 
litigation is designed to prevent the misconduct of managers,62 while D&O insurance is intended 
to protect the managers from the litigation burdens.63  Therefore, D&O insurance could weaken 
the deterrent function of securities litigation and increase corporate misconduct.64 
In light of this problem, D&O insurers have taken various measures to prevent moral 
hazards.65  First, most D&O insurers incorporate deductibles in their coverages.66  Therefore, if a 
claim is made against a director or an officer, the individual official or the company is obligated 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 12.  
56 AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1(i); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 23-4.   
57 See OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 12:20, 12:36; See also KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 
23-4.   
58 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 23-3.    
59 Id. § 23.02, at 23-4.     
60 See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238-39 (1996); See also Peter 
Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives’ Defense Costs, and the Federal 
Courts (Part I), 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 2 (2006), http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article/641/.  
61 See Margulies, supra note 60.  
62 Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 75, 78 (2008).  
63 See Aalten, supra note 8, at 460. 
64 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & 
Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1817-19 (2007).  
65 See id. at 1819-20. 
66 See, e.g., CHUBB CORP., EXECUTIVE PROTECTION PORTFOLIO: DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY 
COVERAGE SECTION § 7 (May 2007), available at 
http://www.chubb.com/international/australia/csi/chubb4263.pdf; See also Baker & Griffith, supra note 64, 
at 1819. 
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to pay the deductible.67  Second, most D&O policies have coverage limitations.68  Therefore, 
when actual losses exceed the coverage limits, the individual official must pay the excess loss.69  
Third, D&O insurers attempt to discourage moral hazards by providing specific exclusions for 
“dishonesty and fraud.”70  Finally, D&O insurers attempt to monitor managers in order to 
prevent misconduct among directors and officers.71  This function of D&O insurance is expected 
to mitigate the moral hazard problem because D&O insurers have the incentive and expertise to 
effectively monitor a corporation.72  Part C of this chapter specifically addresses this monitoring 
role.     
 
B. The Relationship Between Indemnification and D&O Insurance 
 
In the U.S., corporations are generally allowed to purchase D&O insurance for directors 
and officers.73  In most states (other than New York74), corporations can purchase such coverage 
whether or not they are able to indemnify their managers.75  Therefore, D&O insurance can 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 64, at 1819. 
68 See, e.g., AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 5; CHUBB CORP., supra note 66, § 7; See also Baker & 
Griffith, supra note 64, at 1819. 
69 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 64, at 1819. 
70 See, e.g., AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 4(c); CHUBB CORP., supra note 66, § 4.A(ix); See also 
Baker & Griffith, supra note 64, at 1820; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 25.03, at 25-9. 
71 See Clifford G. Holderness, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 115, 
128 (1990).  
72 John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the Quality of 
Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 450 (2000); Griffith, supra note 44, at 1174. 
73 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.57 (2008). 
74 See Bennett L. Ross, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and Other Alternatives, 40 
VAND. L. REV. 775, 784-85 (1987) (explaining that the New York state restricts D&O coverage).   
75 Id. at 784.   
11 
protect directors and officers beyond the coverage of the indemnification.76  D&O insurance also 
fills the void in instances where a corporation does not indemnify its managers.77 
D&O insurance becomes more meaningful in circumstances where the corporation does 
not provide indemnification.78  First, if directors and officers do not act “in good faith”79 or “in a 
manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the 
corporation,”80 or if directors have reasonable cause to believe the person’s conduct was 
unlawful,81 then the directors and officers are not allowed to be indemnified.82  However, in the 
absence of specific limitations in the policy, D&O insurance is able to cover these cases.83  
Second, D&O insurance covers non-indemnifiable loss in situations involving derivative 
actions and public policy prohibitions.84  In the case of derivative actions, corporations are not 
allowed to indemnify managers for judgments or settlement sums, whereas D&O insurance can 
reimburse them for sums paid.85  According to the Delaware General Corporation Law 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Id.    
77 See AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 1; See also KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 23.02, at 
23-3.     
78 See OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 12:3, at 12-9 to -10.  
79 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a), (b); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a)(1)(i). 
80 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a), (b). 
81 Id.  
82 Id.; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.51(a)(1).  
83 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g); See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.57.  
84 See OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 12:3, at 12-10.  
85 Compare DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a), with id. § 145(b); See also OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 5:19, 
at 5-40.  In addition, S. Samuel Arsht and Walter K. Stapleton commented on these provisions as follows: 
 
It was ultimately determined that the statute should authorize only the indemnification of 
litigation expenses and not of amounts paid in satisfaction of a judgment or in settlement of a claim. To 
permit the corporation to nullify a judgment in its favor against a director simply by refunding the 
director’s payment on it would, in the committee’s judgment, subvert the substantive provisions of the 
corporation law and should not be permitted. With respect to payments in settlement of a derivative 
action, it was the committee’s view that to permit such indemnification would have the ultimate effect 
of discouraging settlements since, in such a situation, derivative plaintiffs could demonstrate no benefit 
arising to the corporation from their action and, presumably, could not justify being reimbursed for 
their litigation expenses, including counsel fees. 
 
S. Samuel Arsht & Walter K. Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, 
23 BUS. LAW. 75, 79-80 (1967).  
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(“Delaware G.C.L.”), although corporations are generally allowed to indemnify managers for 
expenses, judgments, fines and settlement sums,86 in claims made “by or in right of the 
corporation,” the indemnification is limited to expenses.87  However, the law does not contain 
such limitations for D&O insurance.88  Therefore, expenses, as well as judgments and 
settlements arising in derivative action are insurable.89 
Furthermore, corporations are prohibited from indemnifying managers for violations of 
the federal securities laws, but they are allowed to purchase insurance for their managers to cover 
liabilities relating to these laws.90  For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) has not allowed indemnification for violation of the 1933 Act on the grounds that such 
indemnification goes against public policy.91  According to the SEC, Congress primarily sought 
to “stimulate diligence on the part of those persons who are actually responsible for the 
preparation of registration statements” in the enactment of Section 11 of the 1933 Act.92  
Therefore, “it is clearly contrary to public policy to allow directors to avoid any consequences 
for their lack of diligence…by indemnification from the issuer.”93  
In contrast, the SEC has considered insurance for liabilities under the 1933 Act 
permissible, regardless of whether a corporation funds the insurance premiums.94  Although 
public policy concerns about moral hazard have likewise been raised in the context of D&O 
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89 Ross, supra note 74, at 785-86. 
90 Id. at 786; See also DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASE AND 
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91 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.510, .512(h)(3) (2008); Ross, supra note 74, at 786.  
92 Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection Against 
Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1162 (1972) (quoting Brief for SEC as 
Intervenor, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)). 
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insurance, the SEC has drawn a distinction between indemnification and insurance.95  While the 
SEC has not provided specific reasons, it can be supposed that several issues have been taken 
into consideration: that a qualified person is reluctant to serve as a manager without adequate 
protection from the burdens of securities litigation;96 that recruiting a talented manager benefits 
shareholder interests;97 that insurance premiums funded by a corporation are comparably small;98 
that insurance coverage is already restricted under various exclusions and insurance laws;99 and 
that insurers regularly monitor the conduct of managers to prevent moral hazards.100  Given these 
considerations, it is understandable that the SEC draws distinctions between D&O insurance and 
indemnification in the case of liabilities under the federal securities laws.101 
Finally, D&O insurance serves an important function even when indemnification not 
permissible.102  Only D&O insurance can cover losses when a corporation cannot afford to 
indemnify directors and officers due to insolvency or financial problems.103  Moreover, some 
corporations may not be legally obligated to indemnify managers shortly after a hostile 
merger.104   
 
C. Monitoring Corporate Governance 
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95 See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 22.21, at 22-50.11.  
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D&O insurance is considered to have great potential to monitor corporate governance 
because it regularly assesses D&O risks when determining premium amounts.105  This 
monitoring role of D&O insurance may reduce the moral hazard problem because D&O insurers 
have the incentive and expertise to prevent manager misconduct.106 
Corporate governance is a crucial factor in establishing D&O premiums.107  Generally, 
poor corporate governance tends to trigger securities litigation.108  Therefore, in order to avoid 
claims on the policy, each insurance company uses its own assessment methods to assess D&O 
risks before extending an insurance agreement.109  Each company’s goal is to accurately assess 
the risk in order to calculate the proper insurance premium.110  D&O insurance companies, 
therefore, classify corporations into two groups: 1) corporations with high risk corporate 
governance and 2) corporations with low risk corporate governance.111  
D&O insurers will cover companies with good corporate governance for low premiums, 
whereas companies with poor corporate governance are required to pay high premiums.112  If 
shareholders are able to effectively restrict the conduct of managers within a corporation, D&O 
insurers will consider the corporation to have good governance.113  However, if shareholders are 
not able to regulate managerial conduct, the corporation is considered to have poor 
governance.114  Therefore, D&O premiums will be higher “when inside control of share votes is 
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105 See Holderness, supra note 71 at 128; Core, supra note 72 at 475. 
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greater, when inside ownership is lower, when the board is comprised of fewer outside directors, 
when the CEO has appointed more of the outside directors, and when inside officers have 
employment contracts.”115  Such pricing mechanisms theoretically encourage corporations to 
improve their corporate structures.116  This is because most corporations want to cut expenses by 
eliminating factors which negatively affect governance.117  
However, this mechanism may be problematic since the incentive to improve corporate 
governance is not great enough.118  The expenses for improving governance structures may be 
higher than the saved insurance premiums.  Specifically, premiums have a weak influence on the 
net income of a corporation, whereas governance reform involves the increase of “the costs of 
regularly reviewing and revising internal governance policies—involving expensive legal and 
financial advisors as well as the time and attention of the general counsel and top level 
management.”119 
Although premiums are not enough to compel corporations to improve their governance, 
they may function as an indicator of corporate health, which could in turn affect stock price.120  
Investors could take the premium amount into account when determining whether to purchase or 
sell the corporation’s securities.121  Ideally, D&O insurance companies directly or indirectly 
influence corporate structures by pricing insurance premiums based on corporate governance 
practices.122  
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Nevertheless, pricing mechanisms can also be problematic because most corporations are 
unwilling to disclose their insurance premiums.123  It is extremely disadvantageous for a 
corporation to be the first to disclose its premium, as it receives no benefit and may be giving 
D&O policy information to other corporations.124  
For this reason, Professor Sean Griffith at Fordham Law School suggests reforming 
securities regulations for mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance information,125 such as D&O 
insurance limits, coverage layers, and insurance premiums.126  Furthermore, the disclosure 
should include “(1) the amount and structure of a corporation’s insurance coverage, and (2) 
information on how settlement and defense costs are funded.”127  
Despite Griffith’s recommendations, it is important to note that in the U.S., mandatory 
disclosure of D&O insurance information may increase the likehood of securities lawsuits 
against innocent insured corporations.128  The two main types of litigation are securities class 
action and shareholders derivative action.129  When a company discloses increased insurance 
premiums, securities lawsuits may be filed by shareholders who believe that increased premiums 
tie directly to poor corporate management.130  However, D&O insurance premiums can increase 
for various reasons, such as an insurance company’s financial problems, national financial crises, 
or price fluctuations.  
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127 Baker & Griffith, supra note 37, at 827.    
128 See Tom Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of The Derivative Suit and The 
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Under Griffith’s proposal, insurance details should be disclosed even if the premium 
increase results from factors unrelated to corporate health.131  High premiums or increased 
premiums may lead shareholders to search for a cause of action in corporate governance 
problems, and to file securities lawsuits.132  Even if claims are not based upon sufficient grounds, 
officials are forced to defend themselves in order to prove their innocence.  Defending claims is 
very costly in terms of both time and money.133  Furthermore, as the defense process continues, 
the defendant’s reputation worsens.134  In light of these facts, it is easy to see why defendants in 
securities litigation prefer to settle out of court.135  As a result, an insurance company covering a 
corporation or its officials must pay the settlement amounts regardless of liability.136  
Mandatory disclosure of D&O policy information could exacerbate this problem.  
Abusive securities litigation burdens both the insured and the insurer.137  Furthermore, even 
though some propose the disclosure of these premiums in order to signal information about 
corporate governance,138 such governance information is already available through other 
channels, such as stock price and rating companies’ announcements.  For this reason, disclosure 
of D&O insurance policy information would be better left to each company’s discretion. 
 
 
III. Overview of D&O Liability Insurance in South Korea  
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18 
A. Versions of D&O Policy 
 
There are two versions of D&O insurance policies in South Korea: a Korean version and 
an English version.139  When D&O insurance was first introduced to Korea, only the English 
version was used.140  Nevertheless, the English version was not suitable for the Korean legal 
system because the English policy terms were partly inconsistent with Korean legal terms.141  
Therefore, the Korean version of the D&O policy was developed in 1999.142  Yet the Korean 
D&O Policy is not a mere translation of the English version.  Rather, the Korean version 
includes different content from that of the English version.143  Generally, the Korean version is 
used only for domestically insured corporations.144  The English version is used for corporations 
which need reinsurance by other international insurance companies.145  
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Insured 
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1. Overview 
 
In order to be protected under D&O liability insurance, claims must be brought against an 
“insured.”146  Therefore, the definition of “insured” is important in determining whether the 
D&O policy applies.147  D&O insurance traditionally covers only the individual directors and 
officers, and the corporation which indemnifies them.148  However, some Korean policies 
provide coverage for the corporation itself in some designated cases, such as securities claims.149 
 
2. Directors and officers 
 
Both the Korean and English versions of D&O liability insurance cover directors and 
officers as the insured.150  In both versions, it is not possible to cover only one particular officer 
as the insured because all of the officers are jointly liable for damages to the corporation.151  
Thus, insuring a single manager results in protection of the other managers as well.152   
The Korean version of D&O liability insurance adopts the same definition of directors as 
the Korean Commercial Act, which states that directors shall be elected at a general 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Officers Liability Insurance] (Sept. 30, 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Chonbuk National University) (on 
file with author). 
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shareholders’ meeting153 and that their names and residence numbers shall be registered.154  The 
policy also permits individuals who have not undergone this formal process to be insured as long 
as they are functioning as directors of a company.155  Therefore, officials who are not officially 
registered as directors but engage in the day-to-day operations of a business can be covered 
under D&O insurance.156  The policy requires all officials to be listed on the policy form.157  A 
“director” or an “officer” not only includes current directors and officers, but also retired 
managers and managers newly appointed during the insured period.158  A manager who retires 
before the opening of the first policy period is excluded.159  If a manager dies, his heirs or legal 
representatives are considered the insured.160  In bankruptcy, both a manager and a trustee are 
considered as one insured entity.161  Furthermore, directors and officers of a subsidiary company 
are insured because the Korean version includes coverage for not only the named company but 
also its subsidiaries.162 
The English version of D&O insurance is similar to the Korean version in that it provides 
coverage for “any past, present or future duly elected or appointed directors or officers of the 
company,” and “all new directors and officers during the policy period of this policy.”163  In 
addition, it covers “the estates, heirs, or legal representatives of deceased directors or 
officers,”164 as well as “the legal representatives of directors or officers in the event of their 
incompetence, insolvency or bankruptcy, who were directors or officers at the time of the 
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wrongful acts upon which such claims are based were committed.”165  As a result, unlike the 
Korean version, the English verison protects the estates of deceased officials as insureds.166  
Similarly, in the event of incompetence or insolvency, the legal representatives of such officials 
are insured.167  Like the Korean version, the English version covers directors and officers of 
subsidiaries.168   
 
3. The corporation 
 
The corporation may also be included within the definition of “insured.”169  The English 
version of D&O policy stipulates that two types of coverage be provided for corporations.170  
The first type of coverage reimburses the corporation’s expenditures when the corporation 
indemnifies its directors and officers.171  This provision is located in the common policy.172  The 
second type of coverage provides entity coverage.173  It covers losses arising from securities 
claims made against the company in a separate special clause rather than in the common 
policy.174  Thus, this second type of coverage is optional.  In order to protect the corporation as a 
whole under the policy, each party must add the special clause to the common policy.175 
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The Korean version also provides both company reimbursement coverage and entity 
coverage.176  However, as opposed to the English version, the Korean version places both 
coverage types in special clauses.177  Therefore, under the Korean version of D&O policy, not 
only is entity coverage optional but company reimbursement coverage is too.  
Thus, in either version of the policy, a corporation may be covered in one of two ways as 
long as it satisfies the definition of a company.178  Both versions define “company” as including 
not only the named corporation but also its subsidiaries.179  When a company obtains “more than 
50% of the total issued and outstanding shares in another corporation,” the former is considered a 
parent company and the latter is considered its subsidiary.180  In addition, if a parent company 
and its subsidiary company have (or if the subsidiary has by itself) stock “more than 50% of the 
total issued and outstanding shares in another corporation,” that other corporation is also 
considered a subsidiary company.181  As a result, in D&O insurance, “company” means the 
named company and its designated subsidiaries in the policy, as well as any newly created 
subsidiaries acquired after the effective date of D&O insurance.182  If a subsidiary company has 
its own subsidiary, it is also covered under the policy.183  
 
C. Covered Risk 
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In order to be protected under D&O insurance, a “claim” must be made during the policy 
period because Korean D&O insurance is a claims-made insurance.184  Non-D&O insurance 
policies are generally based upon occurrence, meaning that the insurer is not obligated to cover 
loss unless it occurs during the policy period even if claims are made after the policy period.185  
In contrast, D&O insurance operates on a claims-made basis, because it is difficult to place a 
time period on when directors and officers act and when the damages are established.186  For this 
reason, D&O coverage is triggered when claims are first made against directors and officers.187  
 The Korean D&O policy does not define “claim,” which may trigger legal disputes 
regarding D&O insurance coverage.188  It is not clear whether “claim” embraces a civil, criminal, 
administrative, regulatory, or arbitration proceeding for monetary, non-monetary or injunctive 
relief.189  In particular, it is questionable whether Korean Financial Supervisory Services 
investigations are covered as a type of claim.  When a regulatory agency such as the Financial 
Supervisory Service begins investigating directors and officers or a corporation, the proceedings 
may cause officials or the corporation to incur substantial defense costs.190  Therefore, disputes 
may occur concerning whether or not administrative investigations are covered under D&O 
policy.  
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In addition, under the Korean D&O policy, the insured should notify the insurer shortly 
after claims are brought against the insured.191  The notice generally includes the allegation, “the 
names of claimants and the manner in which the insureds first became aware of the claim.”192  
The notification requirement is considered to be satisfied when the notice is mailed.193 
 
D. Coverage 
 
In order to be protected under D&O insurance, the insured should have “losses” as a 
D&O policy typically provides coverage only for losses arising from claims made against 
insureds.194  “Loss”, as covered in the English version of the D&O policy, includes damages, 
judgments, settlements and defense costs.195  This section stipulates that the term “loss” excludes 
“civil or criminal fines or penalties imposed by law, punitive or exemplary damages, the 
multiplied portion of multiplied damages, [and] taxes,”196 as well as “any amount for which the 
insureds are not financially liable or which are without legal recourse to the insureds, or matters 
which may be deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this policy shall be 
construed.”197  
Under the Korean version of the D&O policy, “loss” includes legal damages and defense 
costs.198  It does not explicitly mention judgments or settlements, which creates difficulties in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
191 HYUN DAI HAE SANG [HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS.], supra note 1, § 18; HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS., 
supra note 1, § 8.  
192 Id.  
193 Id.  
194 HYUN DAI HAE SANG [HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS.], supra note 1, § 2(1), (2); HYUNDAI MARINE & 
FIRE INS., supra note 1, § 1; OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 12:10, at 12-26. 
195 HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS., supra note 1, § 2(d).   
196 Id. § 2(d).    
197 Id.       
198 Id. § 5.    
25 
interpreting the scope of the damages.199  However, “legal damages” in the Korean version is 
considered to include judgments because the purpose of D&O insurance is to cover loss arising 
from claims, and judgments are the typical results of such claims.  Furthermore, “legal damages” 
may include settlements because admitting or assuming liability for damages entails settling.200  
The Korean version of the policy allows the insured to admit liability for damages with the prior 
written consent of the insurer.201  However, in the Korean version, “loss” does not cover taxes, 
penalties, fines, punitive or exemplary damages, the multiplied portion of multiplied damages, or 
damages increased on an agreement.202  Unlike the English version, it excludes damages 
increased on an agreement, and it does not exclude “any amount for which the insureds are not 
financially liable or which are without legal recourse to the insureds, or matters which may be 
deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which this policy shall be construed.” 203 
 
E. Exclusion 
 
In order to be protected under D&O insurance, a claim should not fall under any 
exclusion in the policy.204  Both the Korean and English versions of D&O policy contain 
exclusions.  
The English version of D&O policy stipulates that the insurer shall not be liable to cover 
loss if claims are involved in (a) personal profit or advantage,205 (b) dishonest or criminal acts,206 
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(c) return of remuneration without shareholders’ approval,207 (d) insider trading profits,208 (e) 
commissions, political payments, and gratuities,209 (f) prior acts, or prior or pending litigation,210 
(g) discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants,211 (h) directorship or officership for any 
other entity,212 (i) nuclear material,213 (j) bodily injury, emotional injury, property damages, and 
personal injury,214 (k) subsidiary officers’ or directors’ wrongful acts occurring at any time when 
the subsidiary requirement is not satisfied,215 and (l) derivative action.216  Moreover, the English 
version of the D&O policy has special exclusion clauses including the Punitive Damage 
Exclusion Clause, Nuclear Energy Liability Exclusion Clause, Prior Acts Exclusion Clause, 
Failure to Maintain Insurance Exclusion Clause, Captive Insurance Company Exclusion Clause, 
Regulatory Exclusion Clause, SEC Exclusion Clause, ERISA Exclusion Clause, Year 2000 
Exclusion Clause, Professional Services Liability Exclusion Clause, Insured v. Insured Exclusion 
Clause, Closely-Held Clause, Financial Institution Clause, and Bankruptcy Exclusion.217  
The Korean version of the D&O policy stipulates that the insurer shall not be liable to 
cover loss if claims are involved in (a) personal profit or advantage,218 (b) dishonest or criminal 
acts,219 (c) return of remuneration without shareholders’ approval,220 (d) insider trading profits,221 
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(e) commissions, political payments, and gratuities,222 (f) prior acts, or prior or pending 
litigation,223 (g) discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants,224 (h) nuclear material,225 (i) 
bodily injury, emotional injury, property damages, and personal injury,226 (j) subsidiary officers’ 
or directors’ wrongful acts occurring at any time when the subsidiary requirement is not 
satisfied,227 (k) insured v. insured,228 (l) closely-held clause,229 (m) directorship or officership for 
any other entity,230 (n) derivative action.231  Moreover, it has special exclusion clauses including 
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act exclusion, the Regulatory Exclusion Clause, 
the Year 2000 Exclusion Clause, the Financial Institution Clause, the Failure to Maintain 
Insurance Exclusion clause, and the Securities and Exchange Act Exclusion.232  
 
IV. Comparison of U.S. and South Korean D&O Liability Insurance 
 
A. Purchasing Insurance 
 
The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) and Delaware G.C.L. permit a 
corporation to purchase and maintain D&O insurance for directors and officers notwithstanding a 
corporation’s ability to indemnify.233  In most U.S. jurisdictions, therefore, a corporation can 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
222 Id. § 7(6).        
223 Id. § 8(5).            
224 Id.               
225 Id. § 8(6).    
226 Id. § 8(7).    
227 Id. § 8(8).    
228 Id. § 8(9).     
229 Id. § 8(10).   
230 Id. § 8(11) (excluding claims against any act while serving as a director or an officer of a different 
corporation).  
231 Id. § 9.         
232 Id. at 17-32. 
233 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.57 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (2001).  
28 
legally provide insurance for directors and officers.234  Moreover, under the Delaware G.C.L., 
the board of directors is entitled to determine the compensation for directors.235  Thus, in the U.S., 
the board of directors can commit to paying D&O insurance premiums, even if the payments 
become part of the compensation.236 
The Korean Commercial Act does not provide any standards for D&O insurance.237  Thus, 
the legal theory in this area is not sufficient, and many problems remain unresolved.  One of the 
controversial issues is whether or not a corporation has the right to purchase such insurance on 
behalf of directors and officers.238 
Some argue that a corporation should be allowed to purchase D&O insurance on behalf 
of the directors and officers239 in order to guarantee reimbursement of any losses accrued on 
behalf of the corporation.240  This policy of reimbursement benefits the entire corporate entity241 
and allows directors and officers to work more actively for the corporation.242  Furthermore, 
some argue that the Korean Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act indirectly permits a 
corporation to buy insurance for its officials by excluding D&O insurance premiums from the 
income tax list.243 
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Others argue that a corporation should not pay D&O insurance premiums on the grounds 
that such expenses cause a loss to the corporation, and thus, the decision to pay those premiums 
violates the fiduciary duty of the directors.244  Moreover, it is often argued that free D&O 
coverage encourages managers to be imprudent in their business judgment because they are then 
free to rely on the insurance policy to cover their mistakes.245  Thus, the U.S. concern about 
moral hazard is likewise present in Korea. 
Furthermore, corporate funding for D&O insurance may violate the Korean Commercial 
Act, which requires consent from all shareholders in order to dismiss managers from 
responsibility.246  The Korean Commercial Act stipulates that directors are liable for the loss to 
their corporation when they neglect their duty or violate laws or by-laws.247  In order to 
discharge such directors from liability, the entirety of the company’s shareholders must consent 
to the exemption.248  If a corporation purchases D&O insurance for its officials, the corporation, 
in effect, renounces any future claims against officials.249  Purchasing the insurance policy 
without any consent indirectly violates the Korean Commercial Act Article 400.250  
Of the two arguments presented above, the former appears to be more persuasive because 
it accurately reflects the corporate world.  A corporation needs to pay insurance premiums in 
order to attract qualified officials.  Such insurance coverage is not only advantageous for 
officials, but also for the entire corporate entity.  Second, there is no violation of Article 400 of 
the Korean Commercial Act even if a corporation purchases the insurance without consent of its 
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shareholders, as exemption from liability is distinguished from payment when liability is 
established.251  Therefore, although it is necessary to limit the potential abuse of corporate 
expenses for D&O insurance, the requirement under Article 400 does not apply in the purchase 
of insurance policies.  Instead, the concept of compensation, which includes basic salary, 
incentives, and life insurance premiums, could be considered.252  Similar to life insurance 
premiums, D&O insurance premiums would also be considered as part of an official’s 
compensation.253  Thus, Article 388 of the Korean Commercial Act (as opposed to Article 400) 
applies to insurance premiums.254  As a result, a corporation can legally purchase the insurance 
for its directors and officers if the insurance premium funding is approved by “affirmative votes 
of a majority of the voting rights of shareholders present thereat and representing at least 1/4 of 
the total issued and outstanding shares” in a shareholder’s meeting.255   
 
B. The Scope of Coverage 
 
1. Defense Obligation 
 
Controversy exists concerning the defense of litigation in D&O coverage.256  The first 
and most basic issue is whether the insurers have an obligation to defend in securities 
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litigation.257  The second issue is whether the insurance covers defense costs.258  If so, the last 
crucial issue becomes whether defense costs are advanced.259 
Because corporations and managers want to control the defense process, such as choice 
of counsel and settlement,260 the typical U.S. D&O insurance policy provides that the insurer is 
not subject to any defense obligation.261  For similar reasons, the Korean D&O policy also 
refuses to impose a duty to defend upon the insurer.262  
Generally, instead of a duty to defend, the insurer has a duty to pay.263  Exactly when 
such costs should be paid is a significant issue that must be outlined in the insurance 
agreement.264  Requiring insurance companies to advance defense costs is often beneficial.265  
The insurance company may incur huge financial losses when directors and officers cannot 
afford to defend themselves and thus fail in their defense.266  Because of such risks, U.S. D&O 
policies began to provide the option to advance defense costs in each case.267  For example, the 
insurance policy in Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corp stated that “[t]he Insurer may at its option 
and upon request, advance…expenses which they have incurred in connection with claims made 
against them, prior to disposition of such claim[s]….”268 
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This option to advance costs is problematic because it places the insurer as the holder of 
the option.269  In Okada, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals resolved the issue regarding the 
option to advance defense costs by interpreting the policy terms in favor of the insured.270  The 
court found that legal defense costs should be paid contemporaneously unless the policy 
obviously provides for the exclusion.271  Therefore, the insurer should pay defense costs as they 
are incurred when the policy terms are vague and the insured could reasonably believe that the 
insurer would pay attorney fees contemporaneously.272  
In Okada, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant should pay defense costs concurrently 
on the grounds that the costs were covered under the policy.273  However, the defendant 
countered that the D&O policy did not guarantee contemporaneous payment of litigation 
expenses274 because the policy terms provided that the insurer would pay defense costs 
immediately only when the insured obtained the insurer’s approval to such coverage.275  The 
court held that the insurer should pay defense costs as they were incurred when the insured could 
reasonably believe they would receive contemporaneous payment of litigation expenses and the 
policy did not mention otherwise.276  This holding is based upon the general insurance principle 
that policy terms should be construed in favor of the insured when the terms are vague.277  
Okada had a significant influence on the U.S. insurance market.278  After Okada, a 
number of D&O policies started to explicitly state that defense costs could not be advanced or 
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that the insured had the right to choose to receive defense costs in advance.279  Ultimately, the 
policies provided that defense costs be advanced automatically if the insured corporation could 
not assume the defense costs.280  Furthermore, most current D&O policies advance defense costs 
whether or not an insured corporation pays the expenses: 281 “…the Insurer shall 
advance…covered Defense Costs no later than ninety (90) days after the receipt by the Insurer of 
such defense bills.”282 
Similar to the practice in the U.S., Korean D&O coverage generally entails defense costs 
under the Korean Commercial Act.283  The Act stipulates that liability insurance covers defense 
costs.284  However, the Act does not provide for exactly when defense costs are to be paid, and 
thus the timing of payment depends upon the terms of each policy.285  Korean D&O policy 
provides that the insurance company “may” advance defense costs and that there is “no duty to 
reimburse defense costs prior to the final disposition of the claim.”286  Therefore, the timing of 
the advance is fully dependent upon the discretion of the insurer.287  If the insurer refuses to 
advance the expenses, the directors and officers have to defend the lawsuit at their own 
expense.288  
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Current Korean D&O coverage raises issues similar to those in Okada289 because Korean 
insurance companies desire to be in the more favorable position.290  For example, a multinational 
insurance company, such as the American Home Assurance Company Korea,291 takes the 
advantage by using a different policy form in Korea.292  The policy used in Korea gives the 
insurer the option to advance defense costs, whereas the common practice now in the U.S. is to 
provide automatic advancement of defense costs.293  
 
2. Settlement 
 
Settlement is a significant issue arising in D&O insurance because most securities 
lawsuits are settled before adjudication.294  Generally, U.S. D&O policy provides coverage for 
settlement as part of a loss.295  The English version of Korean D&O policy also clearly states that 
it covers settlements.296  However, the Korean version merely provides for legal damages and 
defense costs, and does not mention settlement sums.297  The question then becomes whether the 
legal damages include judgment as well as settlement sums under the Korean version of D&O 
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policy.298  In Korea, D&O professionals, making inferences from other provisions that allow the 
insured to admit liability for damages with the prior written consent of the insurer,299 consider 
settlements to be covered under the current policy.300  However, in order to protect the insured, 
specifications regarding settlement costs need to be added to the Korean version’s coverage 
provisions. 
The typical U.S. D&O policy also requires that the insured obtain the insurer’s written 
consent prior to settlement.301  The purpose of the consent is to protect an insurer from a 
conspiracy between parties or lawyers, which could disadvantage the insurers.302  In order to 
prevent ethical violations, Korean D&O policies also provide a consent requirement.303  Such a 
requirement protects the insurer from having to pay uncovered claims.304  If the insured settles 
without the insurer’s consent, the insurance company does not have to cover the losses.305  
It is questionable exactly when this “prior” approval must be obtained.306   In Caterpillar, 
Inc. v. Great American Insurance Co., the court found that consent was required before settling a 
claim, but not before a settlement was offered.307  In that case, the plaintiff argued that the 
insurer should cover the entire settlement amount under the D&O policy.308  However, the 
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defendant countered that the insured violated the policy terms by making a settlement offer 
without the insurer’s consent, and thus the insured was no longer entitled to reimbursement for 
the settlement.309  Furthermore, the insurer contended that the settlement offer was unreasonably 
high.310  The court found that the insured was not required to receive the insurer’s consent prior 
to the offer of settlement.311  The D&O policy only compelled the insured to obtain the insurer’s 
consent before the final settlement.312 
Prior consent from the insurer is designed to prevent collusion between parties or 
lawyers.313  However, it is questionable whether the consent requirement achieves this goal as, 
under U.S. D&O policy, the insurer cannot withhold consent without reasonable grounds.314  If 
the company fails to offer consent for a settlement, it is possible that it “could be liable for the 
entire judgment that results, not just the limits of the D&O insurance policy.”315  
The English version of Korean D&O policy also provides that “The Insurer’s consent 
shall not be unreasonably withheld…”316  However, the Korean version does not provide for 
such limits to consent.317  This gives an unreasonably advantageous position to an insurance 
company when claims occur. 
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3. Allocation 
 
The purpose of D&O insurance is to cover either the loss of individual directors and 
officers when they are not indemnified by their corporation, or the loss of a corporation that 
indemnifies its directors and officers.318  D&O insurance does not aim to protect a corporation 
itself from the loss caused by claims made against the entity in principle.319  Therefore, an 
insurance company can claim allocation between covered officers and the uncovered entity.320  
As a result, even if directors and officers procure losses arising from claims covered under the 
policy, they sometimes face an unexpected decrease in D&O coverage.321  Such curtailment of 
coverage is caused in part by allocations between covered and uncovered parties or matters.322   
Two common law standards exist concerning the allocation of settlement sums.323  The 
first standard is the rule of relative exposure.324  This rule was adopted in Pepsi Company 
Incorporated v. Continental Casualty Company, which required that relative faults should be 
assessed when allocating the settlement amount.325  
In this case, the insured, PepsiCo, contended that the insurer, Continental, should cover 
the entire sum of the settlement because the directors and officers were solely liable and covered 
by Continental.326  Although Continental agreed to the settlement, it rebutted that it was not 
obligated to cover the full amount.327  Continental claimed that the settlement should be allocated 
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to each defendant because the policy states that “it covers only the directors and officers of 
PepsiCo, not the corporation and not its accounting firm.”328  The court found that Continental 
was entitled to “allocate the settlement costs between those amounts attributable to the directors 
and officers and those attributable to PepsiCo and its accountants.”329  
However, under the relative exposure rule, the allocation all too often turns on subjective 
standards.330  Thus, some courts have followed an alternative rule: the larger settlement rule.331  
The larger settlement rule, first adopted in Harbor Insurance Co. v. Continental Bank 
Corp., states that the insurer is obligated only to pay the portion of the settlement caused by an 
insured person.332  In this case, the court held that the insurer was entitled to an allocation of the 
settlement only when the wrongful act of an uninsured party increased the settlement amount.333  
The trial court found that the entire settlement amount should be allocated to Continental.334  
However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision by holding that the entire 
settlement amount should be allocated to the directors.335  According to the Seventh Circuit, the 
insurers were obligated to reimburse the insured for the settlement, excluding the portion of the 
settlement caused by an uninsured person.336  Furthermore, the court found that allocating the 
settlement “between the directors’ liability and the corporation’s derivative liability for directors’ 
act”337 impedes the function of D&O insurance and makes it meaningless.338  
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After Harbor, the court adopted this rule in Caterpillar as well.339  The Caterpillar court 
followed the reasoning of Harbor, based on the larger settlement rule.340  According to the 
court’s decision, the insurer could allocate the settlement and “[t]hat allocation may only reflect 
the extent to which the settlement was larger because of claims against uninsured persons or the 
actions of persons against whom no claims were made.”341  
Most modern U.S. D&O policies provide allocation standards in order to avoid the 
above-mentioned legal disputes.342  American International Group (“AIG”) D&O policy 
stipulates that “[parties]…agree to use their best efforts to determine a fair and proper allocation 
of the amounts…taking into account the relative legal and financial exposures, and the relative 
benefits obtained by any such Insured and any such Organization.”343  Chubb D&O policy 
provides for an arbitration process in allocation disputes.344  However, these provisions still 
contain many opportunities for legal disputes in allocation because they depend largely upon 
subjective matters and negotiations between parties.345  Therefore, some insurers provide entity 
coverage provisions or pre-determined allocation provisions, in order to reduce the possibility of 
disputes regarding allocation in advance.346 
Korean D&O policy also states that parties should cooperate for fair and proper 
allocation but does not indicate any specific allocation method.347  The “fair and proper” 
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standard is extremely vague.348  Thus, the allocation process often faces the same problems with 
subjectivity and negotiation as the AIG and Chubb D&O policies.349  Therefore, Korean D&O 
policy needs to provide more specific standards for allocation.  
 
C. Insured v. Insured Exclusion 
 
A typical U.S. D&O policy contains an insured v. insured exclusion.350  This exclusion 
precludes coverage for claims made by a corporation against insured officials or by an insured 
official against another insured official.351  Under this exclusion, a corporation is not allowed to 
transfer loss arising from management mistakes to a D&O insurance company by bringing an 
action against insured directors and officers.352  Therefore, the corporation cannot collect the 
insurance in order to ease a shortage of cash.353  
Korean D&O policy also contains an insured v. insured exclusion.354  The English 
version precludes “any claim made against the insureds which is brought by any insured or the 
subsidiary or affiliate of the company, or any security holder(s) of any of the above entities...”355  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
348 See HYUN DAI HAE SANG [HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS.], supra note 1, § 20(4); HYUNDAI MARINE & 
FIRE INS., supra note 1, § 9; Hong, supra note 287, at 102. 
349 See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 345, at 608.  
350 AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 4(i); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 25.08, at 25-17.  
351 AM. INT'L GROUP (AIG), supra note 1, § 4(i); OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 12:14, at 12-36.  
352 See OLSON ET AL., supra note 6, § 12:14, at 12-36.   
353 See Township of Ctr., Butler Co., Pa. v. First Mercury Syndicate, Inc., 117 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(explaining that the purpose of the insured v. insured exclusion is “to prevent collusive suits in which an insured 
company might seek to force its insurer to pay for the poor business decisions of its officers or managers.”); 
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 47, § 25.08, at 25-19.  
354 HYUN DAI HAE SANG [HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS.], supra note 1, § 8(9); HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE 
INS., supra note 1, at 32 (Insured vs. Insured Exclusion Clause).    
355 HYUNDAI MARINE & FIRE INS., supra note 1, at 32 (Insured vs. Insured Exclusion Clause). 
41 
This provision is located in a separate special clause.356  However, the Korean version places the 
insured v. insured exclusion within the common policy.357  
In addition, U.S. D&O policy does not allow this exclusion to apply when “such [a] 
security holder’s or member’s Claim is instigated and continued totally independent of, and 
totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active participation of, or intervention of, 
any Executive of an Organization or any Organization.”358  However, Korean D&O policy does 
not state this exception to the exclusion.359  
 
 
V. Recommendations for the Reform of the Korean D&O Liability 
Insurance System 
 
A. Reconsideration of Mandatory Disclosure of D&O Insurance Information 
 
Chapter II of this paper revealed that the U.S. does not require a corporation to disclose 
D&O policy information.360  A non-mandatory disclosure system is more suitable for the U.S. 
because mandatory disclosure may trigger securities lawsuits against innocent insured 
corporations. 
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In contrast to the U.S., the Korean Financial Supervisory Service requires a reporting 
company to disclose D&O insurance information in an annual report.361  Despite such mandatory 
disclosure, securities litigation abuse has not yet been reported in Korea.362  However, securities 
litigation risks have been increasing since the Korean government reduced the requirements for 
shareholder derivative actions in 1998 and established a U.S.-style securities class action system 
in 2004.363  Moreover, if Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreements are approved by their respective 
congresses, a number of U.S. law firms with experience in private securities litigation may begin 
work in Korea.364  Thus, changes in recent years may lead to reconsideration of mandatory 
disclosure of D&O policies in Korea.  
 
B. Recommendations for the Reform of the Korean Commercial Act 
  
The Korean Commercial Act does not provide any standards for D&O insurance.365  The 
only mention of such a standard occurs in the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, which 
permits a corporation to buy the insurance for its officials by excluding D&O insurance 
premiums from the tax list.366  This income tax provision, however, is only weakly linked to 
D&O insurance regulations.367  Instead, it would be much more sensible to delineate D&O policy 
in the corporate section of the Korean Commercial Act.368  In the U.S., even if insurance laws 
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generally regulate insurance markets,369 corporate laws provide more specific regulations for 
D&O insurance in consideration of corporate realities.370  For example, the MBCA and Delaware 
G.C.L. state that a corporation may “purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of” corporate 
directors or officers.371  These provisions reflect the corporate world, in which talented managers 
are reluctant to serve as officials without an insurance policy purchased by a corporation.  One 
solution is to enact provisions that corporations may legally provide insurance for directors and 
officers, and that the premiums be considered a kind of compensation for the officials under the 
Korean Commercial Act.372  The proposed provision would be: “A corporation may purchase 
and maintain insurance on behalf of its corporate directors or officers.  The insurance fee shall be 
considered a part of the compensation of these directors or officers.”373 
 
C. Comments for the Reform of Contents in D&O Policy 
 
1. Clarifying the Scope of Claims 
 
Korean D&O policy, which does not define claims, may result in more legal disputes 
regarding D&O insurance coverage than U.S. policies.374  In order to avoid this problem, Korean 
D&O policy needs to clarify the scope of claims by defining them.  For example, the American 
AIG policy broadly defines “claim” as including “a written demand for monetary, non-monetary 
or injunctive relief;” “a civil, criminal, administrative, regulatory or arbitration proceeding for 
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monetary, non-monetary or injunctive relief;” or “a civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory 
investigation of an insured person.”375  Some argue that such a broad definition is unwise 
because it would allow criminal, administrative or regulatory proceedings to be insured, which 
would violate public policy.376  
However, there is no concern for violations of public policy under Korean D&O 
insurance.  This is because Korean policy excludes results from the aforementioned proceedings, 
such as “taxes, civil or criminal fines or penalties, punitive or exemplary damages, the multiplied 
portion of multiplied damages, or damages increased on an agreement.”377  Therefore, Korean 
policy does not cover final judgments in criminal, administrative or regulatory proceedings.  
Korean D&O policy merely covers the defense costs of such proceedings, which is permissible 
under public policy.  
Such a broad definition of D&O coverage could help avoid disputes regarding whether or 
not administrative investigations are insured under D&O policy.378  D&O policies generally 
cover losses from claims against directors and officers.379  Therefore, if such investigations fall 
within claims, policies will cover investigation expenses as well.380  In Minute International, Inc. 
v. Great American Insurance Co., the court broadly interpreted claims by holding that SEC 
investigations should be insured under D&O policy.381  On the other hand, Minnesota courts 
have narrowly interpreted claims.382  Similar to the U.S., in Korea, it could be questionable 
whether policies cover the Korean Financial Supervisory Services investigations as a kind of 
claim.  Because the purpose of a D&O policy is to support individual directors and officers who 
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cannot solely bear losses, “claims” need to be broadly interpreted to include expenses for the 
Korean Financial Supervisory Services investigations.383  Moreover, similar to a lawsuit, 
investigations take large amounts time and incur high expenses.384  Therefore, Korean D&O 
policy would benefit from a broad definition of “claims.”  This definition could be worded as 
follows: “Claim refers to a written demand for monetary, non-monetary or injunctive relief; a 
civil, criminal, administrative, regulatory or arbitration proceeding for monetary, non-monetary 
or injunctive relief; or a civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory investigation of an insured 
person.”385 
 
2. Guaranteeing the Advancement of Defense Costs 
 
Korean D&O policy gives the insurer the option of advancing defense costs by stating 
that the insurance company “may” advance defense costs.386  Similarly, the Korean Commercial 
Act does not impose upon the insurer the duty to advance defense costs.  Instead, it merely states 
that “the insured may demand from the insurer an advance payment of [defense] expenses.”387 
If an insurer decides not to advance the expenses, the directors and officers then become 
responsible for them.388  However, in the U.S. after Okada in 1986, a number of D&O policies 
started to explicitly state that either defense costs could not be advanced or that the insured had 
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the right to choose to receive defense costs in advance.389  Furthermore, many D&O policies 
began to advance defense costs whether or not an insured corporation paid the expenses.390 
Covering defense costs is a crucial part of D&O insurance.  If the insurer does not cover 
defense costs, most directors and officers cannot afford litigation expenses before a final decision 
is reached.391  This may cause them to lose the lawsuit or settle even if they are not liable.392  
Reimbursing defense costs after losing a lawsuit is futile, and discourages active corporate 
management.393  For this reason, the advancement of defense costs ought to be guaranteed for the 
insured.  Therefore, it is recommended that Korean D&O policy contain an explicit provision 
requiring the advancement of defense costs.394 
 
3. Revising Settlement Provisions 
 
The English version of Korean D&O policy defines “loss” to include amounts paid in 
settlement.395  However, the Korean version merely provides for legal damages and defense 
costs.396  It does not explicitly mention judgments or settlements, which means that insuring 
against them depends entirely upon one’s interpretation.397  This could lead to disputes regarding 
the insurer’s responsibility to cover settlement amounts.398  Therefore, the Korean version needs 
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to clarify the scope of coverage by defining legal damages in a way which includes judgments 
and settlements.  
In the course of settlements, collusion sometimes occurs between parties or lawyers.399  
Such collusion tends to disadvantage the insurers.400  Therefore, Korean D&O policy requires 
that the insured obtain the insurer’s written consent prior to settlement.401  Without such written 
consent, the insurance company is not obligated to reimburse loss.402  Both the U.S D&O policy 
and the English version of Korean D&O policy guarantee the insured’s interest by not allowing 
the insurer to withhold written consent for settlement unless the insurer has reasonable grounds 
to do so.403  However, the Korean version does not provide this condition, which allows the 
insurers to reject settlements whenever they choose.404  In order to protect the insured, the 
Korean version ought to include a condition such as the following: “The insurer’s written 
consent to settlement shall not be unreasonably withheld.”405 
 
4. Providing Specific Allocation Standards 
 
Korean D&O policies do not provide explicit allocation standards.406  They merely 
stipulate that “parties cooperate for fair and proper allocation.”407  Such a statement is extremely 
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vague, and may lead to legal disputes.408  In order to prevent such disputes, Korean D&O policy 
needs to provide more specific standards for allocation.  
Two kinds of common law allocation rulings exist in the U.S. D&O insurance system: a 
relative exposure rule and a larger settlement rule.409  Between them, the larger settlement rule is 
more suitable for a civil law system, such as the Korean legal system, because it is a more 
objective standard than the relative exposure rule.410  Under the larger settlement rule, 
“allocation may only reflect the extent to which the settlement was larger because of claims 
against uninsured persons or the actions of persons against whom no claims were made.”411  
However, the relative exposure rule depends entirely upon judicial discretion.412  Therefore, it is 
suggested that Korean D&O policy include a provision requiring allocation to be based on larger 
settlements.413  Otherwise, in an effort to avoid allocation disputes, both parties in an insurance 
contract may make an agreement including entity coverage or a pre-determined allocation 
percentage.414  As shown in Joseph P. Monteleone’s study, one model of the pre-determined 
allocation could be stated as follows:   
 
Allocation of Securities Claims. The Company, the Directors and/or Officers and 
the Insurer agree to allocate to covered Loss the following portions of any Allocable 
Amount incurred with respect to a Securities Claim:  
 A.       % of all Securities Claim Expenses; and  
 B.       % of all Securities Loss other than Securities Claim Expenses. 
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This agreed allocation shall be final and binding on the Directors and/or Officers, 
the Company and the Insurer.415 
 
 
5. Limiting the Scope of the Insured v. Insured Exclusion 
 
The main purpose of the insured v. insured exclusion is to prevent collusive or “friendly” 
litigation designed to transfer money from the insurer to the corporation.416  If there is no 
collusion involved in the claim, this exclusion should not apply.417  The insured is to be covered 
under the policy when “such [a] security holder’s or member’s Claim is instigated and continued 
totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active 
participation of, or intervention of, any Executive of an Organization or any Organization.”418  
However, Korean D&O policy does not identify exceptions for the exclusion.419  Thus, in cases 
where collusion cannot arise, the insured is not covered under D&O policy.420  Such a problem 
can easily be remedied by modeling the exclusion after the U.S. D&O policy terms.421  Therefore, 
the insured v. insured exclusion ought to include an exception as follows: “The insured is to be 
covered when a claim is made totally independent of any organization or its executives.”422 
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D. Specification of Guidelines for D&O Insurance Coverage in Litigation 
 
Defense costs are another area of potential controversy in Korea.423  The Korean 
Commercial Act states that the insured may demand defense costs in advance.  It also states that 
if the insurer leads the defense, the insurer should pay the entire loss regardless of whether or not 
the defense costs extend beyond the coverage.424  Specific processes, such as allocation, rely on 
policy provisions.425  However, these policy provisions regarding allocation are too vague to 
solve specific legal issues which may arise.426  In order to clarify these provisions, as mentioned 
previously, some reform of the Korean Commercial Act and D&O policy is needed.  However, 
revision of current statutes and policies will take a great deal of time.  Until such a revision of the 
Korean Commercial Act and D&O policy can be made, the guidelines published by the Korean 
Financial Supervisory Service in 2005 may be useful.427  However, these guidelines are not 
sufficient to meet the demands of future D&O insurance disputes.  Therefore, regulatory 
institutions, such as the Financial Supervisory Service, ought to improve the guidelines.  This 
can be accomplished by utilizing the U.S. policies and common law which provide an example 
of how to specify legal processes such as purchasing, coverage, defense costs, settlements, 
allocations and exclusions.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper has discussed D&O liability insurance system in the U.S. and South Korea 
with particular emphasis placed on protection of corporate directors and officers from the 
burdens of securities litigation.  D&O liability insurance is a special insurance product which 
covers loss arising from claims made against directors and officers.428  Corporate directors and 
officers are subject to many responsibilities.429  If they breach these duties, they may be exposed 
to huge financial risks arising from civil lawsuits, criminal proceedings or administrative 
investigations.  Among other things, such litigation and investigations can result in a tremendous 
monetary loss to corporate officials.  Because of these risks, many talented people may avoid 
serving as corporate directors or officers.  Thus, corporations often seek D&O protections to 
assure that they find gifted individuals to manage their businesses.  There are two types of D&O 
protection: indemnification and insurance.430  Indemnification has many limitations.  
Indemnification cannot support directors if they violate federal securities law and is based upon 
on the corporation’s ability to pay.  In contrast, insurance does not have such limitations.  The 
SEC considers D&O insurance to be lawful and permissible, and has not prevented corporations 
from insuring against violations.  Therefore, D&O insurance is the main source of protection for 
directors and officers. 
In the U.S., this insurance was introduced in the 1930’s.431  In Korea, major corporations 
started to purchase the policy after the Asian economic crisis in 1997.432  In 2004, 34.4% of 
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companies listed on the Korea Exchange maintained the policy.433  However, lack of experience 
with D&O insurance may cause problems in operating the system.434  
Most importantly, there is a “moral hazard” concern that D&O insurance could weaken 
the deterrent function of securities law.435  However, D&O premiums may function as an 
indicator of corporate health because D&O insurers monitor corporate financial condition and 
corporate governance when deciding the coverage.436  Therefore, D&O insurance does not 
interfere with the deterring role of corporate and securities law, but rather actually supports that 
function. 
Another concern about D&O insurance is that the Korea Commercial Act does not 
provide any regulatory standards.437  Thus, controversy exists concerning whether or not a 
corporation has the right to purchase such insurance on behalf of directors and officers.  In order 
to avoid disputes regarding the purchaser, this paper proposed that the Korea Commercial Act 
provide explicit provisions to allow corporations to purchase D&O policy for directors and 
officers. 
A third concern is that Korean D&O policy has a Korean version and an English version.  
The coexistence of the two different versions causes confusion in analysis and application of 
Korean D&O policy.  Therefore, some revision of its provisions is required.  Among other things, 
similar to the U.S. D&O policy and English version of the Korean policy, the Korean version 
needs to clarify the scope of coverage by defining legal damages to include judgments and 
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settlements.438  In addition, in order to protect the insured, the Korean version ought to guarantee 
the insured’s coverage interest by not allowing the insurer to withhold written consent to 
settlement unless the insurer has reasonable grounds to do so.  
Another potential issue arises because practice with the insurance and relevant 
jurisprudence is limited in Korea.  However, in the U.S., a number of cases about D&O 
insurance have been accumulated and discussed.  Therefore, it is proposed that American 
solutions to the issues arising in D&O insurance be applied in the Korean system.  Among other 
things, in order to avoid legal disputes in this area, Korean D&O policy needs to clarify the 
scope of claims, the advancement of defense costs and the standards of allocation.439  Moreover, 
in light of protecting the insured’s interest, the scope of the insured v. insured exclusion needs to 
be limited.  However, much time is necessary for such reform of current statutes and policies,440 
and thus Korean regulatory institutions first need to improve their guidelines.  
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